Daily Rules, Proposed Rules, and Notices of the Federal Government
(2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a public, oral hearing. However if FRA receives a specific request for a public, oral hearing prior to November 19, 2012, one will be scheduled and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the
The Track Safety Standards Working Group (Working Group) of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) was formed on February 22, 2006. On October 27, 2007, the Working Group formed two subcommittees: the Rail Integrity Task Force (RITF) and the Concrete Crosstie Task Force. The RITF was tasked to review the reuse of plug rail and the requirements for internal rail flaw inspections. The RITF met 11 times between November 2007 and April 2010. On September 23, 2010 and December 14, 2010, and the RSAC voted to approve the Working Group's recommended text and adopt it as their recommendation to FRA. The RSAC recommendation formed the basis of this NPRM.
This NPRM proposes requirements related to the following subject areas: defective rails, the inspection of rail, qualified operators, and inspection records. The NPRM also addresses the mandate of section 403 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, and removes the joint bar fracture report requirement. The following is a brief overview of the proposal organized by the subject area:
FRA is proposing to provide railroads with a four-hour period in which to verify that a suspected defect exists in the rail section. The primary purpose of the four-hour deferred-verification option is to assist the railroads in improving detector car utilization and production, increase the opportunity to detect larger defects, and ensure that all of the rail the detector car travels over while in service is inspected. Additionally, FRA proposes revisions to the remedial action table in areas such as transverse defects, longitudinal weld defects, and crushed head defects.
Currently, Class 4 and 5 track, as well as Class 3 track over which passenger trains operate, are required to be tested for internal rail defects at least once every accumulation of 40 million gross tons (mgt) or once a year (whichever time is shorter). Class 3 track over which passenger trains do not operate are required to be tested at least once every accumulation of 30 mgt or once per year (whichever time is longer). When this standard was drafted, railroads were already initiating and implementing the development of a performance-based risk management concept for determination of rail inspection frequency that is often referred to as the “self-adaptive scheduling method.” Under this method, inspection frequency is established based annually on several factors, including the total detected defect rate per test, the rate of service failures between tests, and the accumulated tonnage between tests. The railroads then utilize this information to generate and maintain a service failure performance target.
The proposed changes in this NPRM seek to codify standard industry good practices. The NPRM proposes to require railroads to maintain service failure rates of no more than 0.1 service failure per year per mile of track for all Class 4 and 5 track; no more than 0.09 service failure per year per mile of track for all Class 3, 4, and 5 track that carries regularly-scheduled passenger trains or is a hazardous material route; and no more than 0.08 service failure per year per mile of track for all Class 3, 4, and 5 track that carries regularly-scheduled passenger trains and is a hazardous material route.
The NPRM also proposes that internal rail inspections on Class 4 and 5 track, or Class 3 track with regularly-scheduled passenger trains or that is a hazardous materials route, not exceed a time interval of 370 days between inspections or a tonnage interval of 30 million gross tons (mgt) between inspections, whichever is shorter. Internal rail inspections on Class 3 track without regularly-scheduled passenger trains and that is not a hazardous materials route must be inspected at least once each calendar year, with no more than 18 months between inspections, or at least once every 30 mgt, whichever interval is longer, with the additional provision that inspections cannot be more than 5 years apart.
FRA proposes to add a new provision requiring that each provider of rail flaw detection have a documented training program to ensure that a flaw detection equipment operator is qualified to operate each of the various types of equipment currently utilized in the industry for which he or she is assigned to operate.
This NPRM proposes removing the requirement that railroads generate a Joint Bar Fracture Report (Fracture Report) for every cracked or broken continuous welded rail (CWR) joint bar that the track owner discovers during the course of an inspection. The RSAC Working Group ultimately determined that the reports were providing little useful research data to prevent future failures of CWR joint bars. Instead, the Group recommended that a new study be conducted to determine what conditions lead to CWR joint bar failures and include a description of the overall condition of the track in the vicinity of the failed joint(s); photographic evidence of the failed joint, track geometry (gage, alignment, profile, cross-level) at the joint location; and the maintenance history at the joint location.
FRA proposes to require that the railroad's rail inspection records include the date of inspection, track identification and milepost for each location tested, type of defect found and size if not removed prior to traffic, and initial remedial action as required by § 213.113. FRA also proposes that all tracks that do not receive a valid
On October 16, 2008, the RSIA (Pub. L. 110-432, Division A) was enacted. Section 403(a) of the RSIA required the Secretary to conduct a study of track issues, known as the Track Inspection Time Study (Study). The Study was to determine whether track inspection intervals needed to be amended; whether track remedial action requirements needed to be amended; whether different track inspection and repair priorities and methods were required; and whether the speed of track inspection vehicles should be regulated. As part of the study, section 403(b) instructed the Secretary to consider “the most current rail flaw, rail defect growth, rail fatigue, and other relevant track- or rail-related research and studies,” as well as new inspection technologies, and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and FRA accident information. The study was completed and presented to Congress on May 2, 2011. Section 403(c) of the RSIA further provides that FRA prescribe regulations based on the results of the Study two years after its completion.
On August 16, 2011, RSAC accepted RSAC task 11-02, which was generated in response to the RSIA and to address the recommendations of the Study. After several meetings, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) together with the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED) stated that FRA had met its obligations under section 403(c) of the RSIA through its rulemakings on vehicle/track interaction (VTI), concrete crossties, and the proposals contained in this NPRM related to rail integrity. They also stated that additional action on RSAC task 11-02 was unnecessary and recommended that the task should be closed. FRA took the proposal under advisement after the February meeting and conducted its own analysis as to the fulfillment of the mandates under section 403. FRA concluded that these statutory obligations were being fulfilled and on April 13, 2012, the Working Group approved a proposal to conclude RSAC task 11-02. On April 26, 2012, the RSAC concluded that FRA's recent and ongoing rulemakings were sufficiently addressing the statutorily-mandated topics and that no additional work by the RSAC was necessary. Thus, the full RSAC approved the proposal and closed RSAC task 11-02.
The bulk of the proposed regulation revises FRA's Track Safety Standards by codifying current industry good practices. In analyzing the economic impacts of the proposed rule, FRA does not believe that any existing operation will be adversely affected by these changes, nor does FRA believe that the changes will induce any costs.
Through its regulatory evaluation, FRA has explained what the likely benefits for this proposed rule would be, and has provided a cost-benefit analysis. FRA anticipates that this rulemaking would enhance the current Track Safety Standards by allocating more time to rail inspections, increasing the opportunity to detect larger defects sooner, providing assurance that qualified operators are inspecting the rail, and causing inspection records to be updated with more useful information. The main benefit associated with this proposed rule is derived from granting the railroads a four-hour window to verify some defects found in a rail inspection. Without the additional time to verify a defect, railroads currently must stop their inspection anytime a suspect defect is identified, and then resume their inspection after the defect is verified. The defects subject to the proposed deferred verification allowance are usually considered less likely to cause immediate rail failure, and require less restrictive remedial action. The additional time permits railroads to avoid the cost of paying their internal inspection crews or renting a rail car flaw detector an additional half day, saving the industry $8,400 per day. FRA believes the value of the anticipated benefits would easily justify the cost of implementing the rule as proposed.
The rule's total net benefits are estimated to be about $61.3 million over a 20-year period. The benefits are approximately $47.0 million discounted at a 3 percent rate, or about $34.8 million, discounted at a 7 percent rate. FRA believes that such improvements would more than likely result from the adoption of the proposed rule by the railroad industry.
On March 17, 2001, the
The NTSB discovered a broken rail at the point of derailment. The broken pieces of rail were reassembled at the scene, and it was determined that they came from a 15
During the course of the accident investigation, the NTSB could not reliably determine the source of the plug rail. While differing accounts were given concerning the origin of the rail prior to its installation in the track, the replacement rail would most likely have been rail which was removed from another track location for reuse. Analysis of the rail found that the rail failed due to fatigue initiating from cracks associated with the precipitation of internal hydrogen. If the rail had been ultrasonically inspected prior to its reuse, it is likely that the defects could have been identified and that section of rail might not have been used as plug rail.
As a result of its investigation of the Nodaway, Iowa, railroad accident, the NTSB recommended that FRA require railroads to conduct ultrasonic or other appropriate inspections to ensure that rail used to replace defective segments of existing rail is free from internal defects.
On October 20, 2006, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS) train 68QB119 derailed while crossing the Beaver River railroad bridge in New Brighton, Pennsylvania. The train was pulling eighty-three tank cars loaded with denatured ethanol, a flammable liquid. Twenty-three of the tank cars derailed near the east end of the bridge, causing several of the cars to fall into the Beaver River. Twenty of the derailed cars released their loads of ethanol, which subsequently ignited and burned for forty-eight hours. Some of the unburned ethanol liquid was released into the river and the surrounding soil. Homes and businesses within a seven-block area of New Brighton and in an area adjacent to the accident had to be evacuated for days. While no injuries or fatalities resulted from the accident, NS estimated economic and environmental damages to be $5.8 million.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the derailment was an undetected internal rail defect identified to be a detail fracture. The NTSB also noted that insufficient regulation regarding internal rail inspection may have contributed to the accident.
This accident demonstrates the potential for rail failure with subsequent derailment if a railroad's internal rail defect detection process fails to detect an internal rail flaw. This accident also indicates a need for adequate requirements that will ensure rail inspection and maintenance programs identify and remove rail with internal defects before they reach critical size and result in catastrophic rail failures.
On February 24, 2009, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a report presenting the results of its audit of FRA's oversight of track-related safety issues. The report made two findings. First, the OIG found that FRA's safety regulations for internal rail flaw testing did not require the railroads to report the specific track locations, such as milepost numbers or track miles that were tested during these types of inspections. Second, the OIG found that FRA's inspection data systems did not provide adequate information for determining the extent to which FRA's track inspectors have reviewed the railroads' records for internal rail flaw testing and visual track inspections to assess compliance with safety regulations. The OIG recommended that FRA revise its track safety regulations for internal rail flaw testing to require railroads to report track locations covered during internal rail flaw testing, and that FRA develop specific inspection activity codes for FRA inspectors to use to report on whether the record reviews FRA inspectors conduct were for internal rail flaw testing or visual track inspections.
The single most important asset to the railroad industry is its rail infrastructure, and historically the primary concern of the railroad companies is the probability of rail flaw development, broken rails, and subsequent derailments. This has resulted in railroads improving their rail maintenance practices, purchasing more wear-resistant rail, improving flaw-detection technologies, and increasing rail inspection frequencies in an effort to prevent rail defect development. The direct cost of an undetected rail failure is the difference between the cost of replacing the rail failure on an emergency basis, and the cost of the organized replacement of detected defects. However, a rail defect that goes undetected and results in a train derailment can cause considerable additional costs such as excessive service interruption, extensive traffic rerouting, environmental damage, and potential injury and loss of life.
To maximize the life of rail, railroads must accept a certain rate of defect development. This results in the railroad relying on regular rail inspection cycles, and strategically renewing rail that is obviously showing evidence of fatigue. The development of internal rail defects is an inevitable consequence of the accumulation and effects of fatigue under repeated loading. The challenge for the railroad industry is to avoid the occurrence of rail service failure due to the presence of an undetected defect. Rail service failures are expensive to repair and can lead to costly service disruptions and possibly derailments.
The effectiveness of a rail inspection program depends on the test equipment being properly designed and capable of reliably detecting rail defects of a certain size and orientation, while also ensuring that the test frequencies correspond to the growth rate of critical defects. The objective of a rail inspection program is to reduce the annual costs resulting from broken rails, which involve several variables.
The predominant factor that determines the risk of rail failure is the rate of development of internal flaws. Internal rail flaws have a period of origin and a period often referred to as slow crack growth life. The risk is introduced when internal flaws remain undetected during their growth to a critical size. This occurs when the period between when the crack develops to a detectable size is significantly shorter than the required test interval.
In practice, the growth rate of rail defects is considered highly inconsistent and unpredictable. Rail flaw detection in conjunction with railroad operations often presents some specific problems. This is a result of high traffic volumes that load the rail and accelerate defect growth, while at the same time decreasing the time available for rail inspection. Excessive wheel loading can result in stresses to the rail that can increase defect growth rates. Consequently, heavy axle loading can lead to rail surface fatigue that may prevent detection of an underlying rail flaw by the test equipment. Most railroads attempt to control risk by monitoring test reliability through an evaluation process of fatigue service failures that occur soon after testing, and by comparing the ratio of service failures or broken rails to detected rail defects.
The tonnage required to influence defect development is also considered difficult to predict; however, once initiated, transverse defect development is influenced by tonnage. Rapid growth rates can also be associated with rail where high-tensile residual stresses are present in the railhead and in CWR in lower temperature ranges where the rail is in high longitudinal tension.
It is common for railroads to control risk by monitoring the occurrence of both detected and service defects. For U.S. railroads, risk is typically evaluated to warrant adjustment of test frequencies. The railroads attempt to control the potential of service failure by testing more frequently.
In general, the approach in conducting rail integrity research is focused to confirm whether rail defects can be detected by periodic inspection before they grow large enough to cause a rail failure. In the context of rails, damage tolerance is the capability of the rail to resist failure and continue to operate safely with damage (i.e., rail defects). This implies that a rail containing a crack or defect is weaker than a normal rail, and that the rail's strength decreases as the defect grows. As growth continues, the applied stresses will eventually exceed the rail's strength and cause a failure. Such information can be used to establish guidelines for determining the appropriate frequency of rail inspections to mitigate the risk of rail failure from undetected defects.
Current detection methods that are performed in the railroad industry utilize various types of processes with human involvement in the interpretation of the test data. These include the:
• Portable test process, which consists of an operator pushing a test device over the rail at a walking pace while visually interpreting the test data;
• Start/stop process, where a vehicle-based flaw detection system tests at a slow speed (normally not exceeding 20 mph) gathering data that is presented to the operator on a test monitor for interpretation;
• Chase car process, which consists of a lead test vehicle performing the flaw detection process in advance of a verification chase car; and
• Continuous test process, which consists of operating a high-speed, vehicle-based test system non-stop along a designated route, analyzing the test data at a centralized location, and subsequently verifying suspect defect locations.
The main technologies utilized for non-destructive testing on U.S. railroads are the ultrasonic and induction methods. Ultrasonic technology is the primary technology used, and induction technology is currently used as a complimentary system. As with any non-destructive test method, these technologies are susceptible to physical limitations that allow poor rail head surface conditions to negatively influence the detection of rail flaws. The predominant types of these poor rail head surface conditions are shells, engine driver burns, spalling, flaking, corrugation, and head checking. Other conditions that are encountered include heavy lubrication or debris on the rail head.
Induction testing requires the introduction of a high-level, direct current into the top of the rail and establishing a magnetic field around the rail head. An induction sensor unit is then passed through the magnetic field. The presence of a rail flaw will result in a distortion of the current flow, and it is this distortion of the magnetic field that is detected by the search unit.
Ultrasonics can be briefly described as sound waves, or vibrations, that propagate at a frequency that is above the range of human hearing, normally above a range of 20,000 Hz, or cycles per second. The range normally utilized during current flaw detection operations is 2.25 MHz (million cycles per second) to 5.0 MHz. Ultrasonic waves are generated into the rail by piezo-electric transducers that can be placed at various angles with respect to the rail surface. The ultrasonic waves produced by these transducers normally scan the entire rail head and web, as well as the portion of the base directly beneath the web. Internal rail defects represent a discontinuity in the steel material that constitutes the rail. This discontinuity acts as a reflector to the ultrasonic waves, resulting in a portion of the wave being reflected back to the respective transducer. These conditions include rail head surface conditions, internal or visible rail flaws, weld upset/finish, or known reflectors within the rail geometry such as drillings or rail ends. The information is then processed by the test system and recorded in the permanent test data record. Interpretation of the reflected signal is the responsibility of the test system operator.
Railroads have always inspected track visually to detect rail failures, and have been using crack-detection devices in rail-test vehicles since the 1930s. Meanwhile, trends in the railroad industry have been to increase traffic density and average axle loads. Current rail integrity research recognizes and addresses the need to review and update rail inspection strategies and subsequent preventive measures. This would include the frequency interval of rail inspection, remedial action for identified rail defects, and improvements to the performance of the detection process.
FRA has sponsored research related to railroad safety for several decades. One part of this research program is focused on rail integrity. The general objectives of FRA rail integrity research have been to improve railroad safety by reducing rail failures and the associated risks of train derailment, and to do so more efficiently through new maintenance practices that increase rail service life. Brief descriptions of the studies conducted by FRA focus on four different areas: Analysis of rail defects; residual stresses in rail; strategies for rail testing; and other areas related to rail integrity, which include advances in nondestructive inspection techniques and feasibility of advanced materials for rail, rail lubrication, rail grinding, and wear. Moreover, rail integrity research is an ongoing effort, and will continue as annual tonnages and average axle loads increase on the nation's railroads.
Due to the limitations of current technology to detect internal flaws beneath surface conditions and in the base flange area, FRA's research has been focusing on other rail flaw detection technologies. One laser-based ultrasonic rail defect detection prototype, which is being developed by the University of California-San Diego under an FRA Office of Research and Development grant, has produced encouraging results in ongoing field testing. The project goal is to develop a rail defect detection system that provides better defect detection reliability and a higher inspection speed than is currently achievable. The primary target is the detection of transverse defects in the rail head. The method is based on ultrasonic guided waves, which can travel below surface discontinuities, hence minimizing the masking effect of transverse cracks by surface shelling. The inspection speed can be improved greatly also because guided waves run long distances before attenuating.
Non-destructive test systems perform optimally on perfect test specimens. However, rail in track is affected by repeated wheel loading that results in the plastic deformation of the rail running surface that can create undesirable surface conditions as described previously. These conditions can influence the development of rail flaws. These conditions can also affect the technologies currently utilized for flaw detection by limiting their detection capabilities. Therefore, it is important that emerging technology development continue, in an effort to alleviate the impact of adverse rail surface conditions.
The first Federal Track Safety Standards (Standards) were published on October 20, 1971, following the enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Public Law 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (October 16, 1970), in which Congress granted to FRA comprehensive authority over “all areas of railroad safety.”
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20103, the Secretary may prescribe regulations as necessary in any area of railroad safety. As described in the next section, FRA began its examination of rail integrity issues through RSAC on October 27, 2007. Then, on October 16, 2008, the RSIA was enacted. As previously noted, section 403(a) of the RSIA required the Secretary to conduct a study of track issues known as the Track Inspection Time Study (Study). In doing so, section 403(b) required the Secretary to consider “the most current rail flaw, rail defect growth, rail fatigue, and other relevant track- or rail-related research and studies” as part of the Study. The Study was completed and submitted to Congress on May 2, 2011. Section 403(c) also required the Secretary to promulgate regulations based on the results of the study. As delegated by the Secretary,
FRA notes that section 403 of the RSIA contains one additional mandate, which FRA has already fulfilled, promulgating regulations for concrete crossties. On April 1, 2011, FRA published a final rule on concrete crosstie regulations per this mandate in section 403(d). That final rule specifies requirements for effective concrete crossties, for rail fastening systems connected to concrete crossties, and for automated inspections of track constructed with concrete crossties.
In March 1996, FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for developing consensus recommendations to the Administrator of FRA on rulemakings and other safety program issues. RSAC includes representation from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties. An alphabetical list of RSAC members follows:
When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a given task. The task force then provides that information to the working group for consideration.
If a working group comes to a unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff members play an active role at the working group level in discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation.
However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on whether a recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goals, is soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the rulemaking document issued by FRA. However, to the maximum extent practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.
The Track Safety Standards Working Group (Working Group) was formed on February 22, 2006. On October 27, 2007, the Working Group formed two
However, after the New Brighton accident, and in response to NTSB recommendations R-08-9, R-8-10, and R-08-11,
The RITF met on November 28-29, 2007; February 13-14, 2008; April 15-16, 2008; July 8-9, 2008; September 16-17, 2008; February 3-4, 2009; June 16-17, 2009; October 29-30, 2009; January 20-21, 2010; March 9-11, 2010; and April 20, 2010. The RITF's findings were reported to the Working Group for approval on July 28-30, 2010. The Working Group reached a consensus on the majority of the RITF's work and forwarded proposals to the full RSAC on September 23, 2010 and December 14, 2010. The RSAC voted to approve the Working Group's recommended text, which provided the basis for this NPRM.
In addition to FRA staff, the members of the Working Group include the following:
• AAR, including the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., and members from BNSF, Canadian National Railway (CN), Canadian Pacific Railway (CP), CSX Transportation, Inc., The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCS), NS, and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP);
• APTA, including members from Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
• ASLRRA (representing short line and regional railroads);
• John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center)
• NTSB; and
FRA worked closely with RSAC in developing its recommendations and believes that RSAC has effectively addressed rail inspection safety issues regarding the frequency of inspection, rail defects, remedial action, and operator qualification. FRA has greatly benefited from the open, informed exchange of information during the meetings. There is a general consensus among railroads, rail labor organizations, State safety managers, and FRA concerning the primary principles set forth in this NPRM. FRA believes that the expertise possessed by RSAC representatives enhances the value of the recommendations, and FRA has made every effort to incorporate them in this proposed rule.
Nevertheless, the Working Group was unable to reach consensus on one item that FRA has elected to include in this NPRM. The Working Group could not reach consensus on the definition of “segment” length, which FRA proposes to be utilized in a new performance-based test frequency determination in § 213.237, “Inspection of Rail,” as discussed below.
As noted previously, section 403(a) of the RSIA required the Secretary to conduct a study of track issues. The Study was to determine whether track inspection intervals needed to be amended; whether track remedial action requirements needed to be amended; whether different track inspection and repair priorities and methods were required; and whether the speed of track inspection vehicles should be more specifically regulated. In conducting the Study, section 403(b) instructed the Secretary to consider “the most current rail flaw, rail defect growth, rail fatigue, and other relevant track- or rail-related research and studies,” as well as new inspection technologies, and NTSB and FRA accident information. The Study was completed and presented to Congress on May 2, 2011. Section 403(c) further provided that FRA prescribe regulations based on the results of the Study two years after its completion.
On August 16, 2011, RSAC accepted task 11-02, which was generated in response to the RSIA and to address the recommendations of the Study. Specifically, the purpose of the task was “[t]o consider specific improvements to the Track Safety Standards or other responsive actions to the Track Inspection Time Study required by § 403 (a) through (c) of the RSIA and other relevant studies and resources.” The first meeting of the Working Group assigned to the task occurred on October 20, 2011, and a second meeting was held on December 20, 2011. At the third meeting on February 7-8, 2012, the AAR together with the BMWED stated that FRA had met its obligations under section 403(c) of the RSIA through its rulemakings on vehicle/track interaction (VTI), concrete crossties, and the proposals contained in this NPRM on rail integrity. They also stated that additional action on RSAC task 11-02 was unnecessary and recommended that the task should be closed. FRA took the proposal under advisement after the February meeting and conducted its own analysis as to the fulfillment of the mandates under section 403. FRA concluded that these statutory obligations were being fulfilled and on April 13, 2012, the Working Group approved a proposal to conclude RSAC task 11-02. On April 26, 2012, the full RSAC approved the proposal and closed RSAC task 11-02. The recommendation approved by the full RSAC is described below.
In determining whether regulations were necessary based on the results of the Study, RSAC examined the Study's four issues for improving the track inspection process:
• Expanding the use of automated inspections;
• Developing additional training requirements for track inspectors;
• Considering a maximum inspection speed for track inspection vehicles; and
• Influencing safety culture through a safety reporting system.
The Study's first recommendation was that FRA consider expanding the use of automated inspections to improve inspection effectiveness. Specifically, the Study cited two specific track defects that are more difficult to detect through visual track inspection and could benefit from the use of automated inspection: rail seat abrasion (RSA) and torch cut bolt holes. Through discussion among the affected parties, it was determined that these areas of concern already had been covered under previous rulemaking and regulations. The Concrete Crossties final rule published on April 1, 2011, new § 213.234, “Automated inspection of track constructed with concrete crossties,” specifically employs the use of automated inspection “to measure for rail seat deterioration.” In addition, torch cut bolt holes have been prohibited on track classes 2 and above since 1999, which was codified in §§ 213.121(g) and 213.351(f), and they are easily identifiable through the rail flaw detection technology currently in use. Thus, the RSAC concluded that additional regulations to find such defects would be unnecessary.
Outside of these two specific defects, the RSAC concluded that the instant NPRM would also be revising automated inspection standards in other areas, such as ultrasonic testing. For example, this NPRM proposes changing the ultrasonic testing of rail from a standard based on time and tonnage to one based on self-adaptive performance goals. Thus, the full RSAC concluded that the use of automated inspection has been sufficiently expanded in the areas that are most ideally suited for development at this point. While FRA and RSAC noted that they may wish to make changes to the automated inspection standards in the future, FRA and RSAC nevertheless maintained that the changes stated above sufficiently satisfy the RSIA's mandate.
However, RSAC concurred with FRA, BMWED and AAR that it was important to ensure that any type of report generated from the automated inspection of track, regardless of whether it is mandated by regulation or voluntarily utilized by a railroad, be made available to track inspectors. Therefore, in this NPRM, FRA is issuing policy guidance to encourage track owners and railroads to provide the information from their automated track inspections in a usable format to those persons designated as fully qualified under the Track Safety Standards and assigned to inspect or repair the track over which an automated inspection is made. This guidance is as follows:
When automated track inspection methods are used by the track owner, FRA recommends that the information from that inspection be provided or made readily available to those persons designated as fully qualified under CFR 213.7 and assigned to inspect or repair the track over which the automated inspection was made.
The second recommendation the Study addressed was whether FRA should develop additional training requirements for track inspectors. RSAC found that it was unnecessary to generate additional training standards under RSAC task 11-02 for two reasons. First, the instant NPRM proposes to create a new § 213.238 to address an area of training that requires new standards. Proposed § 213.238 defines a qualified operator of rail flaw detection equipment and requires that each provider of rail flaw detection service have a documented training program to ensure that a rail flaw detection equipment operator is qualified to operate each of the various types of equipment currently utilized in the industry for which he or she is assigned, and that proper training is provided in the use of newly-developed technologies. Second, the recently published NPRM on Training, Qualification, and Oversight for Safety-Related Railroad Employees, 77 FR 6412 (proposed Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 49 CFR parts 214, 232, and 243), proposes to require that employers develop and submit for FRA review a program detailing how they will train their track inspectors. As proposed in the NPRM, employees charged with the inspection of track or railroad equipment are considered safety-related railroad employees that each employer must train and qualify. The proposed formal training for employees responsible for inspecting track and railroad equipment is expected to cover all aspects of their duties related to complying with the Federal standards. FRA would expect that the training programs and courses for such employees would include techniques for identifying defective conditions and would address what sort of immediate remedial actions need to be initiated to correct critical safety defects that are known to contribute to derailments, accidents, incidents, or injuries.
The third recommendation of the Study addressed whether track hi-rail inspection speed should be specified. The Study concluded that specifying limits to hi-rail inspection speeds could be “counterproductive.” With the currently-available data in this area, the RSAC concurred with the Study's recommendation, and determined that no further action needed to be taken in this area at this time. The RSAC found that the existing reliance on the “inspector's discretion” as noted in § 213.233, should generally govern track inspection speed. FRA notes that this point will be emphasized in the next publication of FRA's Track Safety Standards Compliance Manual. FRA also makes clear that, in accordance with § 213.233, if a vehicle is used for visual inspection, the speed of the vehicle may not be more than 5 m.p.h. when passing over track crossings and turnouts.
Finally, the last recommendation of the Study addressed ways to enhance the track safety culture of railroads through programs such as a safety reporting system, like the Confidential Close Call Reporting System currently piloted by FRA. The RSAC was aware that the Risk Reduction Working Group was in the process of developing recommendations for railroads to develop risk reduction programs, which should incorporate many safety concerns in this area. Therefore, the RSAC concluded that additional, overlapping discussion was unnecessary given the specific concurrent focus of the Risk Reduction Working Group.
FRA notes that, in addition to addressing the Study's recommendations, RSAC task 11-02 also incorporated other goals Congress had for the Study, which are described in section 403(a), such as reviewing track inspection intervals and remedial action requirements, as well as track inspection and repair priorities. The RSAC concluded that FRA's recent and ongoing rulemakings are sufficiently addressing these areas and that no additional work is currently necessary. Specifically, the instant rulemaking is intended to amend inspection intervals to reflect a new performance-based inspection program, revise the remedial action table for rail, and alter inspection and repair priorities involving internal rail testing and defects such as a crushed head and defective weld. The Concrete Crossties final rule also established new inspection methods and intervals requiring automated inspection, as well as new remedial actions for exceptions that can be field-verified within 48 hours. Finally, in addition to other requirements, the
Therefore, the RSAC recommended and FRA subsequently concluded that additional work on any of these areas would be unnecessary at this time, given the recent and ongoing work of the RSAC and FRA. FRA believes that its recent and ongoing rulemakings sufficiently address the statutorily-mandated topics in section 403 and that no additional work by the RSAC was currently necessary.
FRA proposes to modify paragraph (b) to clarify the exclusion of track located inside a plant railroad's property from the application of this part. In this paragraph, “plant railroad” means a type of operation that has traditionally been excluded from the application of FRA regulations because it is not part of the general railroad system of transportation. In the past, FRA has not defined the term “plant railroad” in other regulations that it has issued because FRA assumed that its
The proposed definition would clarify that when an entity operates a locomotive to move rail cars in service for other entities, rather than solely for its own purposes or industrial processes, the services become public in nature. Such public services represent the interchange of goods, which characterizes operation on the general system. As a result, even if a plant railroad moves rail cars for entities other than itself solely on its property, the rail operations will likely be subject to FRA's safety jurisdiction because those rail operations bring plant track into the general system.
The proposed definition of the term “plant railroad” is consistent with FRA's longstanding policy that it will exercise its safety jurisdiction over a rail operation that moves rail cars for entities other than itself because those movements bring the track over which the entity is operating into the general system.
FRA also makes clear that FRA's Policy Statement addresses circumstances where railroads that are part of the general system may have occasion to enter a plant railroad's property (e.g., a major railroad goes into a chemical or auto plant to pick up or set out cars) and operate over its track. As explained in the Policy Statement, the plant railroad itself does not get swept into the general system by virtue of the other railroad's activity, except to the extent it is liable, as the track owner, for the condition of its track over which the other railroad operates during its incursion into the plant. Accordingly, the rule would make clear that the track over which a general system railroad operates would not be excluded from the application of this part, even if the track is located within the confines of a plant railroad.
The primary purpose of the four-hour deferred-verification option is to assist the railroads in improving detector car utilization and production, increase the opportunity to detect larger defects, and ensure that all the rail the detector car travels over while in service is inspected. FRA is in agreement with the railroad industry that most tracks are accessible by road or hi-rail, and will support a deferred-verification process where the operator can verify the suspect defect location with a portable type of test unit. FRA also agrees that if the detector car travels over the rail while in service it is more beneficial to complete the inspection over that location instead of leaving a possible serious internal defect undetected in the track.
FRA's proposed revisions to the remedial action table would also reduce the current limit of eighty percent of the rail head cross-sectional area requiring remedial action notes “A2” or “E and H” to sixty percent of the rail head cross-sectional area. FRA reviewed the conclusions of the most recent study performed by the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., concerning the development of transverse-oriented detail fracture defects: “Improved Rail Defect Detection Technologies: Flaw Growth Monitoring and Service Failure Characterization,” AAR Report No. R-959, Davis, David D., Garcia, Gregory A., Snell, Michael E., September 2002. (A copy of this study has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.) The study concluded that detail fracture transverse development