Daily Rules, Proposed Rules, and Notices of the Federal Government
* Fax: (202) 493-2251.
* Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
* Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd., Maesbury Road, Oswestry, Shropshire SY10 8ZZ, The United Kingdom; telephone: +44 (0) 1691-671717; fax: +44 (0) 1691-671122; email:
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA AD No.: 2012-0142R1, dated September 14, 2012 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:
Three incidents were reported where the female ACME threaded connectors (Rego type) was leaking when connected to the gas cylinder with the cylinder valve turned on.
The results of the technical investigations revealed the possibility that other similar connectors produced between 01 January 2011 and 01 September 2011 might not have been assembled with sufficient tightness. A list of potentially affected connectors has been drawn up Table 1 of this AD. A list of burners and manifolds on which it is already known that an affected connector has been installed is provided in Table 2 of this AD.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result, in case of an ignition source, in a fire hazard that could damage the balloon and its envelope, ultimately leading to a forced emergency landing, during which balloon occupants and persons on the ground could be injured.
To address this potential unsafe condition, Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd. (who manufactured the hose assemblies) issued Service Bulletin (SB) N°12, which, for the affected parts, requires accomplishment of an inspection of the female ACME thread hose connectors.
For the reasons described above, EASA issued AD 2012-0142, to require an inspection of the female ACME thread hose connectors for leakage, and, depending on findings, to re-torque the connectors using correct values.
Since that AD was issued, it has been determined that the pilot-owner of the balloon can accomplish the inspection of the affected parts to identify the leak. In addition, the risk assessment has been reconsidered, which has led to the conclusion that the compliance time for the inspection can be extended to 60 days after the effective date of the date at original issue. Similarly, as most of the parts have now been inspected and, depending on findings, corrected, it was possible to delete paragraph (3) from the AD, dealing with spare parts.
You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
Although the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) MCAI allows the pilot-owner to do the inspection and
Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd has issued Service Bulletin No. 12, Issue 2, dated May 10, 2012. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all information and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.
We estimate that this proposed AD will affect 2,170 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about .5 work-hour per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $42.50 per work-hour.
Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be $92,225, or $42.50 per product.
In addition, we estimate that any necessary follow-on actions would take about .5 work-hour. We have no way of determining the number of products that may need these actions.
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:
(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
We must receive comments by December 7, 2012.
This AD applies to all hot air balloons, certificated in any category, equipped with Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd female ACME threaded hose connectors, part numbers (P/Ns) HS6139 and HS6144, all serial numbers.
Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 14: Hardware.
This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as insufficient tightness of the threaded hose connector in the assembly area that could result in fuel leakage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct insufficient tightness of the threaded hose connector in the assembly area. This condition, if not corrected, could result in fuel leakage and lead to an inflight fire.
Unless already done, do the following actions:
(1) Within the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the female ACME threaded hose connectors, (P/Ns) HS6139 and HS6144, for leaking in accordance with the instructions of Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd Service Bulletin No. 12, dated May 10, 2012.
(2) If fuel leakage is detected in the inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight, tighten the threaded hose connector to the correct torque following Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd Service Bulletin No. 12, dated May 10, 2012.
(3) If, after the effective date of this AD, you install on any balloon an ACME threaded hose connector, (P/Ns) HS6139 or HS6144, manufactured by Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd. and supplied as a spare part between January 1, 2011, and September 1, 2011, before further flight, you must comply with the actions of this AD.
(4) Although the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) MCAI allows the pilot-owner to do the inspection and correction required in paragraphs (f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(3) of this AD, the U.S. regulatory system requires all actions of this AD be done by a certified mechanic.
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.
Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency AD 12-053, dated May 25, 2012; and Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd Service Bulletin No. 12, dated May 10, 2012, for related information. For service information related to this AD, contact Lindstrand Hot Air Balloons Ltd., Maesbury Road, Oswestry, Shropshire SY10 8ZZ, The United Kingdom; telephone: +44 (0) 1691-671717; fax: +44 (0) 1691-671122; email: