Chapter 8.13.

rinderpest

Article 8.13.1.

For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, the incubation period for rinderpest (RP) shall be 21 days.

For the purpose of this Chapter, a case includes an animal infected with rinderpest virus (RPV).

For the purpose of this Chapter, susceptible animals apply to both domestic and wild artiodactyls.

For the purposes of international trade, this chapter deals not only with the occurrence of clinical signs caused by RPV, but also with the presence of infection with RPV in the absence of clinical signs.

Ban on vaccination against rinderpest means a ban on administering a RP vaccine to any susceptible animal and a heterologous vaccine against RP to any large ruminants or pigs.

1. Animal not vaccinated against RP means:

   1. for large ruminants and pigs: an animal that has received neither a RP vaccine nor a heterologous vaccine against RP;

   2. for small ruminants: an animal that has not received a RP vaccine.

2. The following defines the occurrence of RPV infection:

   1. RPV has been isolated and identified as such from an animal or a product derived from that animal; or

   2. viral antigen or viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) specific to RP has been identified in samples from one or more animals showing one or more clinical signs consistent with RP, or epidemiologically linked to an outbreak of RP, or giving cause for suspicion of association or contact with RP; or

   3. antibodies to RPV antigens which are not the consequence of vaccination, have been identified in one or more animals with either epidemiological links to a confirmed or suspected outbreak of RP in susceptible animals, or showing clinical signs consistent with recent infection with RP.

Standards for diagnostic tests and vaccines are described in the Terrestrial Manual.

Article 8.13.2.

1. have a record of regular and prompt animal disease reporting;

2. send a declaration to the OIE stating that:

   1. there has been no outbreak of RP during the past 24 months,

   2. no evidence of RPV infection has been found during the past 24 months,

   3. no vaccination against RP has been carried out during the past 24 months,

   and supply documented evidence that surveillance for both RP and RPV infection in accordance with Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27. is in operation and that regulatory measures for the prevention and control of RP have been implemented;

3. not have imported since the cessation of vaccination any animals vaccinated against RP.

The Member will be included in the list only after the submitted evidence has been accepted by the OIE. Retention on the list requires that the information in points 2a), 2b), 2c), and 3 above be re-submitted annually and changes in the epidemiological situation or other significant events should be reported to the OIE according to the requirements in Chapter 1.1.

Article 8.13.3.

When a RP outbreak or RPV infection occurs in a RP free country, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of RP free country:

1. 3 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.; or

2. 3 months after the slaughter of all vaccinated animals where a stamping-out policy, emergency vaccination and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.; or

3. 6 months after the last case or the last vaccination (according to the event that occurs the latest), where a stamping-out policy, emergency vaccination not followed by the slaughter of all vaccinated animals, and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.

Where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do not apply but Article 8.13.2. applies.

Article 8.13.4.

Article 8.13.5.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the animals:

1. showed no clinical sign of RP on the day of shipment;

2. remained in a RP free country since birth or for at least 30 days prior to shipment.

Article 8.13.6.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. RP is the subject of a national surveillance programme according to Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.;

2. RP has not occurred within a 10-kilometre radius of the establishment of origin of the animals destined for export for at least 21 days prior to their shipment to the quarantine station referred to in point 3b) below;

3. the animals:

   1. showed no clinical sign of RP on the day of shipment;

   2. were kept in the establishment of origin since birth or for at least 21 days before introduction into the quarantine station referred to in point c) below;

   3. have not been vaccinated against RP, were isolated in a quarantine station for the 30 days prior to shipment, and were subjected to a diagnostic test for RP on two occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 21 days;

   4. were not exposed to any source of infection during their transportation from the quarantine station to the place of shipment;

4. RP has not occurred within a ten-kilometre radius of the quarantine station for 30 days prior to shipment.

Article 8.13.7.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. the donor animals:

   1. showed no clinical sign of RP on the day of collection of the semen;

   2. were kept in a RP free country for at least 3 months prior to collection;

2. the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5.

Article 8.13.8.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. RP is the subject of a national surveillance programme according to Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.;

2. the donor animals:

   1. showed no clinical sign of RP on the day of collection of the semen;

   2. were kept in an establishment where no RP susceptible animals had been added in the 21 days before collection, and that RP has not occurred within 10 kilometres of the establishment for the 21 days before and after collection;

   3. were vaccinated against RP at least 3  months prior to collection; or

   4. have not been vaccinated against RP, and were subjected to a diagnostic test on two occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 21 days within the 30 days prior to collection;

3. the semen was collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.5.

Article 8.13.9.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. the donor females were kept in an establishment located in a RP free country at the time of collection;

2. the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7.

Article 8.13.10.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. RP is the subject of a national surveillance programme according to Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.;

2. the donor females:

   1. and all other animals in the establishment showed no clinical sign of RP at the time of collection and for the following 21 days;

   2. were kept in an establishment where no RP susceptible animals had been added in the 21 days before collection of the embryos;

   3. were vaccinated against RP at least 3 months prior to collection; or

   4. have not been vaccinated against RP, and were subjected to a diagnostic test for RP on two occasions with negative results, at an interval of not less than 21 days within the 30 days prior to collection;

3. the embryos were collected, processed and stored in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4.7.

Article 8.13.11.

for fresh meat or meat products of susceptible animals

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment comes from animals which have been kept in the country since birth or for at least 3 months prior to slaughter.

Article 8.13.12.

for fresh meat (excluding offal) of susceptible animals

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the entire consignment of meat:

1. comes from a country where RP is the subject of a national surveillance programme according to Articles 8.13.20. to 8.13.27.;

2. comes from animals which:

   1. showed no clinical sign of RP within 24 hours before slaughter;

   2. have remained in the country for at least 3 months prior to slaughter;

   3. were kept in the establishment of origin since birth or for at least 30 days prior to shipment to the approved abattoir, and that RP has not occurred within a ten-kilometre radius of the establishment during that period;

   4. were vaccinated against RP at least 3 months prior to shipment to the approved abattoir;

   5. had been transported, in a vehicle which was cleansed and disinfected before the animals were loaded, directly from the establishment of origin to the approved abattoir without coming into contact with other animals which do not fulfil the required conditions for export;

   6. were slaughtered in an approved abattoir in which no RP has been detected during the period between the last disinfection carried out before abattoir and the date on which the shipment has been dispatched.

Article 8.13.13.

for meat products of susceptible animals

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. only fresh meat complying with the provisions of Article 8.13.12. has been used in the preparation of the meat products; or

2. the meat products have been processed to ensure the destruction of the RPV in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Article 8.5.32.;

3. the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the meat products with any possible source of RPV.

Article 8.13.14.

for milk and milk products intended for human consumption and for products of animal origin (from RP susceptible animals) intended for use in animal feeding or for agricultural or industrial use

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products come from animals which have been kept in the country since birth or for at least 3 months.

Article 8.13.15.

for milk and cream

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. these products:

   1. originate from herds or flocks which were not subjected to any restrictions due to RP at the time of milk collection;

   2. have been processed to ensure the destruction of the RPV in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Articles 8.5.36. and 8.5.37.;

2. the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the products with any potential source of RPV.

Article 8.13.16.

for milk products

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. these products are derived from milk complying with the above requirements;

2. the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the milk products with a potential source of RPV.

Article 8.13.17.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that the manufacturing method for these products included heating to a minimum internal temperature of 70°C for at least 30 minutes.

Article 8.13.18.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that:

1. these products have been processed to ensure the destruction of the RPV in conformity with one of the procedures referred to in Articles 8.5.33., 8.5.34. and 8.5.35.;

2. the necessary precautions were taken after processing to avoid contact of the products with any potential source of RPV.

Veterinary Authorities can authorise, without restriction, the import or transit through their territory of semi-processed hides and skins (limed hides, pickled pelts, and semi-processed leather - e.g. wet blue and crust leather), provided that these products have been submitted to the usual chemical and mechanical processes in use in the tanning industry.

Article 8.13.19.

Veterinary Authorities should require the presentation of an international veterinary certificate attesting that these products:

1. were completely dried and had no trace on them of skin, flesh or tendon; and/or

2. have been adequately disinfected.

Article 8.13.20.

In order to receive OIE recognition of rinderpest freedom, a country’s national authority must present for consideration a dossier of information relating to its livestock production systems, rinderpest vaccination and eradication history and the functioning of its Veterinary Services. The dossier must contain convincing evidence derived from an animal disease surveillance system that sufficient evidence has accrued to demonstrate that the presence of rinderpest virus would have been disclosed were it to be present. Recommendations on the structure and the functioning of Veterinary Services and diagnostic support services are provided in Chapters 3.1. and 3.2. of the Terrestrial Code. A Member must also be in compliance with its OIE reporting obligations (Chapter 1.1. of the Terrestrial Code).

Article 8.13.21.

1. Rinderpest

   For the purpose of this Chapter, rinderpest is defined as an infection of large ruminants (cattle, buffaloes, yaks, etc.), small ruminants, pigs and various wildlife species within the order Artiodactyla, caused by rinderpest virus. In small ruminants and various species of wildlife, particularly antelopes, infection generally passes without the development of frank clinical signs. Characteristic clinical signs and pathological lesions are described in Chapter 2.1.15. of the Terrestrial Manual.

   Outbreaks of rinderpest in cattle may be graded as per-acute, acute or sub-acute. Differing clinical presentations reflect variations in levels of innate host resistance (Bos indicus breeds being more resistant than Bos taurus), and variations in the virulence of the attacking strain. It is generally accepted that unvaccinated populations of cattle are likely to promote the emergence of virulent strains and associated epidemics while partially vaccinated populations favour the emergence of mild strains associated with endemic situations. In the case of per-acute cases the presenting sign may be sudden death. In the case of sub-acute (mild) cases, clinical signs are irregularly displayed and difficult to detect.

   Freedom from rinderpest means freedom from rinderpest virus infection.

2. Rinderpest vaccines

   For the purpose of this Chapter and the Terrestrial Code, OIE-recognised rinderpest vaccines currently in use, or likely to become so in the forseeable future, are considered to be commercial modified live vaccines produced from attenuated rinderpest virus (referred to as ‘rinderpest vaccine’) produced in accordance with Chapter 2.1.15. of the Terrestrial Manual.

Article 8.13.22.

General recommendations on animal disease surveillance are outlined in Chapter 1.4. of the Terrestrial Code.

Rinderpest must be a notifiable disease i.e. notification of outbreaks of rinderpest as soon as detected or suspected must be brought to the attention of the Veterinary Authority.

The precise surveillance information required for establishing freedom will differ from country to country depending on factors such as the former rinderpest status of the country, the regional rinderpest situation and accreditation status, the time elapsing since the last occurrence of rinderpest, livestock husbandry systems (e.g. extensive pastoralism, nomadism and transhumance versus sedentary agropastoralism) and trading patterns.

Evidence of efficiency of the surveillance system can be provided by the use of performance indicators.

Surveillance results presented will be expected to have accrued from a combination of surveillance activities including some or all of the following:

1. A routine national animal disease reporting system supported by evidence of its efficiency and follow-up - an on-going, statutory, centrally organised system of reporting

   Ideally disease reports should be expressed in a Geographical Information System environment and analysed for clustering of observations and followed up.

2. Emergency disease reporting systems and investigation of epidemiologically significant events (‘stomatitis-enteritis syndrome’)

   Emergency reporting systems can be devised to short-circuit normal passive reporting systems to bring suspicious events to the fore and lead to rapid investigation and tracing. All such investigations should be well documented for presentation as an outcome of the surveillance system.

3. Detection and thorough investigation of epidemiologically significant events (‘stomatitis-enteritis syndrome’) which raise suspicion of rinderpest supported by evidence of efficiency of the system

   Laboratory examination undertaken to confirm or rule out rinderpest is given extra credibility if it is accompanied by the results of differential diagnostic examinations.

4. Searching for evidence of clinical rinderpest

   Active search for disease might include participatory disease searching combined with village disease searching, tracing backwards and forwards, follow-up and investigation.

5. Serosurveillance

   1. Randomised serosurveys

      Statistically selected samples from relevant strata within the host populations are examined to detect serological evidence of possible virus circulation.

      A sampling unit for the purposes of disease investigation and surveillance is defined as a group of animals in sufficiently close contact that individuals within the group are at approximately equal risk of coming in contact with the virus if there should be an infectious animal within the group. In most circumstances, the sampling unit will be a herd which is managed as a unit by an individual or a community, but it may also be other epidemiologically appropriate groupings which are subject to regular mixing, such as all animals belonging to residents of a village. In the areas where nomadic or transhumant movements exist, the sampling unit can be the permanent bore holes, wells or water points. Sampling units should normally be defined so that their size is generally between 50 and 1,000 animals.

      1. Criteria for stratification of host populations

         Strata are homogeneously mixing sub-populations of livestock. Any disease surveillance activities must be conducted on populations stratified according to the management system, and by herd size where this is variable. Herds, or other sampling units, should be selected by proper random statistical selection procedures from each stratum.

      2. Field procedures and sample sizes

         Annual sample sizes shall be sufficient to provide 95% probability of detecting evidence of rinderpest if present at a prevalence of 1% of herds or other sampling units and 5% within herds or other sampling units. This can typically be achieved by examining 300 herds per stratum per year, but procedures for sampling should be in accordance with the “Guide to Epidemiological Surveillance for Rinderpest”², or another procedure that would achieve the same probability of detection.

         Where the sampling frame of herds is known, herds shall be selected for examination by the use of random number tables. Otherwise, samples of herds can be selected by taking the nearest herd to a randomly selected map reference, provided that the herds are evenly distributed. Failing this, any herd(s) within a fixed radius of randomly selected map references should be sampled. It must be compulsory for any selected herd to be examined or tested as required.

         In carrying out clinical surveillance for evidence of rinderpest, all animals in selected herds or sampling units will be examined by a veterinarian for signs of the disease, especially mouth lesions. Any positive result shall be evaluated using epidemiological and laboratory methods to confirm or refute the suspicion of rinderpest virus activity. All animals born after the cessation of vaccination and more than one year old will be eligible for serological testing.

         Where operational considerations require it, the number of eligible animals tested within each sampled herd may be reduced. This will reduce the probability of within-herd detection and there must be at least a compensatory increase in the number of herds sampled, so that the required 95% probability of detecting 1% between-herd prevalence is maintained.

   2. Risk-focussed serosurveillance

      Risk-focussed serosurveillance differs from randomised serosurveillance in that it increases detection sensitivity by obtaining samples from areas/populations determined to be at higher risk of infection, so as to detect serological evidence of possible virus circulation. The operational modalities for risk-based focussing of surveillance require definition (randomisation within defined focus, high risk animals, etc.). The extent to which randomisation needs to be retained in the generation of risk-focussed serosurveillance data needs to be established.

      Focussing can be achieved by reference to some or all of the following:

      1. Historical disease patterns (prior probability mapping) – clinical, participatory and laboratory-based

      2. Critical population size, structure and density

      3. Livestock husbandry and farming systems

      4. Movement and contact patterns – markets and other trade-related movements

      5. Transmission parameters (e.g. virulence of the strain, animal movements)

      6. Wildlife and other species demography.

Article 8.13.23.

Thus selecting a cohort of cattle possessing only one pair of permanent incisors will preclude any interference from maternal immunity derived from earlier vaccination or infection and ensure that vaccinated cattle are not included if vaccination ceased 3 years or more previously (for Asian buffaloes 4 years or more).

Although it is stressed here that animals with milk teeth only are not suitable for surveillance based on serology, they are of particular interest and importance in surveillance for clinical disease. After the loss of colostral immunity, by about one year of age, these are the animals which are most likely to suffer the more severe disease form and in which to look for lesions indicative of rinderpest.

Article 8.13.24.

There are some key wildlife populations, especially African buffaloes, which act as sentinels for rinderpest infection. Where a significant population of a susceptible wildlife species exists, serosurveillance data are required to support absence of infection. These populations should be monitored purposively to support the dossiers to be submitted for freedom from rinderpest virus infection. Detection of virus circulation in wildlife can be undertaken indirectly by sampling contiguous livestock populations.

Obtaining meaningful data from wildlife surveillance can be enhanced by close coordination of activities in the regions and countries. Both purposive and opportunistic samplings are used to obtain material for analysis in national and reference laboratories. The latter are required because most countries are unable to perform the full testing protocol for detecting rinderpest antibodies in wildlife sera.

Purposive sampling is the preferred method to provide wildlife data to evaluate the status of rinderpest infection. In reality, the capacity to perform purposive work in the majority of countries remains minimal. Opportunistic sampling (hunting) is feasible and it provides useful background information.

Wildlife form transboundary populations; therefore, any data from the population could be used to represent the result for the ecosystem and be submitted by more than one country in a dossier (even if the sampling was not obtained in the country submitting). It is therefore recommended that the countries represented in a particular ecosystem should coordinate their sampling programmes.

The standards for serosurveillance are different from that set for cattle because the serological tests are not fully validated for wildlife species and financial and logistic constraints of sampling prevent collection of large numbers of samples.

From the collective experience of the laboratories and experts over the years, an appropriate test protocol is based on the high expected sero-prevalence in a previously infected buffalo herd (99% seroconversion of eligible animals within a herd), which is detected using a test, which is 100% sensitive. No single test can achieve this; however, combining H c-ELISA to VNT raises sensitivity close to 100%.

In the order of 1-2% of a herd of African buffaloes must be sampled to ensure that no positive case is missed. For example in a herd of 300 buffaloes, five animals should be sampled and the above multiple test protocol followed. Where the serological history of the herd is known from previous work (as might be the case for a sentinel herd), repeat sampling need only focus on the untested age groups, born since the last known infection. Appropriate sampling fraction for other wildlife species are less well defined, as social organization (herd structure, likely contact rates, etc.) vary. The sample needs to be taken according to the known epidemiology of the disease in a given species. Opportunistic samples, which are positive, should not be interpreted without a purposive survey to confirm the validity of these results. Opportunistic sampling cannot follow a defined protocol and therefore can only provide background information.

Article 8.13.25.

Article 8.13.26.

1. that within most previously infected countries, rinderpest vaccine will have been used to control the rate of infection;

2. that within an endemically infected population there will be a large number of immune hosts (both vaccinees and recovered animals);

3. that the presence of a proportion of immune hosts within a vaccinated population could have led to a slowing of the rate of virus transmission and possibly the concomitant emergence of strains of reduced virulence, difficult to detect clinically;

4. that the virulence of the virus (and therefore the ease of clinical detection) may or may not increase as the herd immunity declines following withdrawal of vaccination; however, continuing transmission will generate serological evidence of their persistence.

Before accreditation can be considered, countries which have controlled the disease by the use of rinderpest vaccine must wait until an unvaccinated cohort is available to allow meaningful serological surveillance to be conducted.

The OIE has concluded that the majority of countries have stopped vaccinating for a sufficient length of time for it now to be feasible that a single submission of evidence gained over 2 years of appropriate surveillance shall be sufficient to gain rinderpest free accreditation.

A Member accredited as free from rinderpest must thereafter submit annual statements to the Director General of the OIE indicating that surveillance has failed to disclose the presence of rinderpest, and that all other criteria continue to be met.

A country previously infected with rinderpest which has not employed rinderpest vaccine for at least 25 years and has throughout that period detected no evidence of rinderpest virus disease or infection may be accredited as free from rinderpest by the OIE based on historical grounds, provided that the country:

• has had throughout at least the last 10  years and maintains permanently an adequate animal disease surveillance system along with the other requirements outlined in Article 8.13.25.;

• is in compliance with OIE reporting obligations (Chapter 1.1.).

The Veterinary Authorities of the Member must submit a dossier containing evidence supporting their claim to be free from rinderpest on a historical basis to the Director General of the OIE for evaluation by the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases and accreditation by the OIE International Committee. The dossier should contain at least the following information:

• a description of livestock populations, including wildlife;

• the history of rinderpest occurrence in the country and its control;

• an affirmation that rinderpest has not occurred for 25 years, that vaccine has not been used during that time, and that rinderpest is a notifiable disease;

• evidence that in the last 10 years the disease situation throughout the Member has been constantly monitored by a competent and effective veterinary infrastructure that has operated a national animal disease reporting system submitting regular (monthly) disease occurrence reports to the Veterinary Authority;

• the structure and functioning of the Veterinary Services;

• the Member operates a reliable system of risk analysis based importation of livestock and livestock products.

Evidence in support of these criteria must accompany the Member’s accreditation application dossier. In the event that satisfactory evidence is not forthcoming, the OIE may seek clarification or refer the dossier back to the originators, giving its reasons for so doing. Under such circumstances a fresh dossier would be entertained in due course.

OR

A Member having eradicated rinderpest within the last 25 years, wishing to be accredited free from rinderpest and having ended rinderpest vaccination must initiate a two-year surveillance programme to demonstrate freedom from rinderpest whilst banning further use of rinderpest vaccine. The step of accreditation as free from rinderpest is subject to meeting stringent criteria with international verification under the auspices of the OIE.

A country historically infected with rinderpest but which has convincing evidence that the disease has been excluded for at least 2 years and is not likely to return, may apply to OIE to be accredited as free from rinderpest. The conditions which apply include that an adequate animal disease surveillance system has been maintained throughout at least that period.

The Veterinary Authority of the Member must submit a dossier containing evidence supporting their claim to be free from rinderpest to the Director General of the OIE for evaluation by the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases and accreditation by the OIE International Committee showing that they comply with:

• the provisions outlined in this Chapter;

• OIE reporting obligations outlined in Chapter 1.1. of the Terrestrial Code.

Other conditions that apply are:

• The Member affirms that rinderpest has not occurred for at least 2  years, that vaccine has not been used during that time, and that rinderpest is a notifiable disease.

• The Veterinary Authority has issued orders curtailing the distribution and use of rinderpest vaccine in livestock.

• The Veterinary Authority has issued orders for the recall and destruction of rinderpest vaccine already issued.

• The Veterinary Authority has issued orders restricting the importation of rinderpest vaccine into, or the further manufacture of rinderpest vaccine within, the territory under his jurisdiction. An exception can be made for establishing a safeguarded rinderpest emergency vaccine bank under the control of the Chief Veterinary Officer who can demonstrate that no calls have been made on that vaccine bank.

• The Veterinary Authority has set in place a rinderpest contingency plan.

• Over the previous 2  years at least, the disease situation throughout the Member has been constantly monitored by a competent and effective infrastructure that has operated a national animal disease reporting system submitting regular (monthly) disease occurrence reports to the Veterinary Authority.

• All outbreaks of disease with a clinical resemblance to rinderpest have been thoroughly investigated and routinely subjected to laboratory testing by an OIE recognised rinderpest-specific test within the national rinderpest laboratory or at a recognised reference laboratory.

The dossier shall contain:

• the results of a continuous surveillance programme, including appropriate serological surveys conducted during at least the last 24  months, providing convincing evidence for the absence of rinderpest virus circulation;

• a description of livestock populations including wildlife;

• the history of rinderpest occurrence in the country and its control;

• an affirmation that rinderpest has not occurred for at least 2 years, that vaccine has not been used during that time, and that rinderpest is a notifiable disease;

• evidence that in the last 2 years the disease situation throughout the Member has been constantly monitored by a competent and effective veterinary infrastructure that has operated a national animal disease reporting system submitting regular (monthly) disease occurrence reports to the Veterinary Authority;

• the structure and functioning of the Veterinary Services;

• the Member operates a reliable system of risk analysis based importation of livestock and livestock products.

In the event that satisfactory evidence in support of the application is not forthcoming, the OIE may seek clarification or refer the dossier back to the originators, giving its reasons for so doing. Under such circumstances a fresh dossier would be entertained in due course.

Article 8.13.27.

Should there be an outbreak, or outbreaks, of rinderpest in a Member at any time after recognition of rinderpest freedom, the origin of the virus strain must be thoroughly investigated. In particular it is important to determine if this is due to the re-introduction of virus or re-emergence from an undetected focus of infection. The virus must be isolated and compared with historical strains from the same area as well as those representatives of other possible sources. The outbreak itself must be contained with the utmost rapidity using the resources and methods outlined in the Contingency Plan.

After elimination of the outbreak, a Member wishing to regain the status ‘free from rinderpest’ must undertake serosurveillance to determine the extent of virus spread.

If investigations show the outbreak virus originated from outside the country, provided the outbreak was localised, rapidly contained and speedily eliminated, and provided there was no serological evidence of virus spread outside the index infected area, accreditation of freedom could proceed rapidly. The country must satisfy the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases that the outbreaks were contained, eliminated and did not represent endemic infection.

An application to regain the status free from rinderpest shall not generally be accepted until both clinical and serological evidence shows that there has been no virus transmission for at least 3 or 6 months, depending on whether or not stamping-out or vaccination respectively has been applied.

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1. [Note: International veterinary certificates for animal products coming from RP infected countries, may not be required if the products are transported in an approved manner to premises controlled and approved by the Veterinary Authority of the importing country for processing to ensure the destruction of the RPV as described in Articles 8.5.33, 8.5.34. and 8.5.35.]

2. JAMES A.D. (1998). Guide to epidemiological surveillance for rinderpest. Rev. Sci. Tech. 17 (3), 796–824.